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Support for the Unemployed in a Familistic Welfare 
Regime: the case of Greece1
 
Theodoros Papadopoulos 2
 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This chapter explores welfare support for the unemployed in Greece and its role in the 
reproduction of the Greek welfare regime. It consists of four sections. The first section 
provides a conceptual framework for the concepts of ‘the welfare system’ and ‘welfare 
regime’, as well as an alternative conceptualization of ‘passive’ and ‘active’ labour market 
policies. The second section examines the structure of employment and unemployment in 
Greece in the light of the economic restructuring that the country currently is experiencing. 
The third section examines the state’s response to the increase in unemployment and the 
policies that aim to support the unemployed both in terms of their income and their 
opportunities to find employment. The fourth section explores in more detail the policies for 
income support for the unemployed and offers a comparative evaluation of the income 
packages available to different types of households experiencing unemployment. The analysis 
ends with some reflections on the character of the Greek welfare regime and the role of 
unemployment compensation. 
 
The argument presented in this chapter is that the levels of welfare support for the 
unemployed in Greece are extremely low by international standards while access to them is 
restricted to only small numbers of this group. Against this background, it appears that for the 
majority of unemployed people it is the family that acts as the main factor behind their 
decommodification, i.e. their survival outside the market on some minimum living standard. 
This, in turn, reinforces and reproduces the familistic character of the Greek welfare regime, 
highlighting the important economic function that the family unit is called to play in a period 
of rapid economic and social change.  
 
Conceptual framework: welfare regimes and unemployment compensation systems 
 
Historically, the establishment of unemployment compensation systems are linked to  the 
emergence of welfare statism, i.e. the involvement of the state in the provision and 
distribution of welfare in national market economies during the 20th century. Analytically 
speaking, welfare statism comprises two elements, a welfare system and a welfare regime. 
The former refers to the system of institutions regulating the production, distribution and 
consumption of welfare in a capitalist nation-state. An unemployment compensation system is 
a constituent part of its respective national welfare system. 
 
                                                 
1 Copyright note: This chapter is published as Papadopoulos T. (2006), 'Support for the Unemployed in a Familistic 
Welfare Regime', in Mossialos E. and Petmesidou M. (eds.), Social Policy Developments in Greece, Aldershot: 
Ashgate. This online version of the paper may be cited or briefly quoted in line with the usual academic conventions. You 
may also download it for your own personal use. This paper must not be published elsewhere (e.g. mailing lists, bulletin 
boards etc.) without the author's explicit permission. Please note that (a) if you copy this paper you must include this 
copyright note; (b) this paper or any translation of it must not be used for commercial purposes or gain in any way; (c) you 
should observe the conventions of academic citation. 
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Further, a welfare system is embedded in - and reproduces - its respective national welfare 
regime. As Taylor-Gooby (1996, p.200) puts it, a welfare regime is ‘a particular constellation 
of social, political and economic arrangements which tend to nurture a particular welfare 
system, which in turn supports a particular pattern of stratification, and thus feeds back into 
its own stability’. More specifically, a welfare regime can be seen as the mode of politico-
economic governance that institutionalizes the roles of the state, market, family and the 
voluntary sector in the production, distribution and consumption of welfare in a capitalist 
nation-state. In this context, a welfare regime comprises both the power differentials between 
socio-economic groups and classes and the hegemonic cultural/historical discourse within 
which these differentials are legitimized. Indeed, as Kemeny argued, it is precisely because 
‘[the] differential structuring of power relationships between classes in modern societies is a 
political and policy making process‘ (Kemeny, 1995, p. 89) that distinct types of welfare 
regimes can be analytically differentiated.  
 
Moreover, the reproduction of a particular type of welfare regime is influenced by the 
international politico-economic environment, i.e., the supra-national and/or global politico-
economic structures and processes that are exogenous to capitalist nation-states. The 
importance of these forces and pressures in shaping the developmental trajectories of welfare 
regimes is, as we know, a subject of intense debate. Suffice to say at this point that, while 
most commentators seem to agree on the need of welfare regimes to further re-adjust in order 
to sustain their fundamental character as welfare regimes (Esping-Andersen, 2002; Clasen, 
2002; Kohli and Novak, 2001; Streek, 2001) others view such re-adjustments as leading to 
their fundamental transformation from welfare to workfare regimes ( Jessop, 2002)  
 
At the heart of these debates is the emphasis on work - narrowly defined as participation in a 
labour market - as a means of social protection in an era of employment insecurity and 
‘flexibility’. The emerging hegemonic view is that welfare states should be transformed into 
‘active welfare states’ (Esping-Andersen et al., 2002), which should pursue, among other 
things, the activation of the unemployed as a means to achieving their re-commodification (in 
de-regulated labour markets, we could add). Such perspectives reproduce the interpretation of 
the causes of unemployment and the role of labour markets that became hegemonic during the 
1990s.1 Namely, that unemployment is ‘a product of inflexible labour markets and welfare state‘ 
that, combined with the lack of skills on behalf of the unemployed, places the European welfare 
states in front of ‘a trilemma between equality, employment and balanced state budgets‘ 
(Andersen et al., 2002, p.7). It is beyond the purpose of this chapter to provide a theoretical 
critique of these perspectives, a task that has been successfully undertaken by other authors (e.g. 
Standing, 2002; 2000). Nevertheless, this chapter provides empirical evidence that suggest that 
such perspectives have little relevance for Greece due to the particular characteristics of its 
labour market structure, its unemployment compensation system and its welfare regime.  
 
In doing so, this chapter adopts a critical attitude towards the conventional differentiation 
between ‘passive’ labour market policies and ‘active’ labour market policies.2 Throughout the 
chapter, these two words are placed within quotes and, when possible, an analytical 
differentiation between de-commodification policies and re-commodification polices for the 
unemployed is adopted. Indeed, this chapter perceives the adequacy of unemployment 
compensation as one of the key indicators of societal control over the functioning of the 
(labour) market.  
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The structure of employment and unemployment in Greece 
 
The structure of employment in Greece  
 
Greece has been, and is still, undergoing a period of intensive economic restructuring 
precipitated by the gradual opening of the Greek economy to European and global 
competition during the late 1980s and 1990s (OECD, 2002; Petmesidou, 2001). Key features 
of this restructuring are the reduction of employment in industry and agriculture and the rapid 
expansion of employment in the service sector. In particular, by 2001 the share of 
employment in industry was reduced to 24 per cent of total employment from 27 per cent in 
1990. More dramatic was the reduction in the share of employment in agriculture. It fell from 
23 per cent in 1990 to 16 per cent in 2001. The same period saw the rapid expansion of the 
service sector from 50 per cent in 1990 to almost 60 per cent in 2001 (European Commission, 
2002a, p.177). 
 
The structure of employment in Greece resembles that of other southern European member 
states, namely comparatively low activity rates,3 especially of women, high levels of self-
employment and very low levels of part-time employment. In particular, during the period 
1990-2001, and despite increased participation by women and immigrants, the Greek activity 
rate remained consistently below the respective European Union (EU) average rate. By 2001 
it stood at 62 per cent of the working age population, well below the EU average of 69 per 
cent. This was primarily due to a low female activity rate, which, although it has increased 
since the late 1970s, remains substantially lower than the EU average. By 2001, the women 
who were employed - or were actively seeking work - constituted approximately 49 per cent 
of women of working age. This was 11 percentage points lower that the respective EU 
average of 60 per cent (European Commission, 2002a, pp.173,177). 
 
Furthermore, self-employment in Greece is more than double the EU average. In 2001 it stood 
at 32 per cent, compared to an EU average of 15 per cent (OAED, 2002). However, when 
observed across time, its share in overall employment has decreased significantly: in 1990 it 
stood at 38 per cent (European Commission, 2002a, pp.173,177). On the other hand, part-time 
employment remains well below the EU average. In 2001 it stood at 4 per cent of total 
employment, less that one fourth of the respective EU rate of 18 per cent, while the trend 
indicates a steady reduction from 1998 onwards (European Commission, 2002a, p.177). 
 
The impact of economic restructuring 
 
The indicators above paint a picture of an economy and a society undergoing a period of rapid 
social and economic change. Indeed, the pace of economic restructuring accelerated during 
the second half of the 1990s when the government’s economic policy efforts concentrated on 
two targets. First, meeting the criteria for Greece’s participation in the  European Monetary 
Union (EMU) and second, enhancing economic growth. Based on a series of economic 
austerity measures this parallel effort was eventually successful, albeit with a very high social 
cost. On the one hand stood the success of entering EMU, a dramatic reduction of inflation 
from 11.2 per cent in 1994 to 3.2 per cent in 2001 and an impressive average annual GDP 
growth of 3.2 per cent for the period 1994-2002 (European Commission, 2002a, p.167). On 
the other hand stood the dramatic increase in officially recorded4 unemployment that rose 
from 6.4 per cent of the labour force in 1990 to almost 12 per cent at the beginning of 2000.  
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Nevertheless, from the year 2000 onwards the Greek unemployment rate started declining 
slightly and, by the end of 2002, it was approximately 10 per cent. Still, this was only partly 
attributable to increases in employment (see also Table 10.2), increases that were mainly in 
the construction industry and mostly in low paid, low skilled jobs. Data from a Greek 
National Statistics Office report5 revealed that an influential factor behind the observed 
decrease in unemployment rates was the reduction of labour force participation, mainly due to 
an increase in inactivity (‘discouragement effect’). According to this report, although 
unemployment was reduced by 16.2 per cent (84,000 persons) during the period 1998-2003, 
employment increased by only 1.1 per cent, (44,800 persons). Meanwhile the inactive 
population increased by 8.9 per cent (approximately 39,200 persons) with a large number of 
inactive persons being young men. In short, unemployment in Greece remains high and is 
accompanied by significant increases in inactivity.  
  
Probably the most important feature of this dramatic increase in unemployment during the last 
decade was the spectacular rise in female unemployment (see also Chapter 11). Historically, 
female unemployment in Greece has been consistently more than double that of men, a 
pattern that continued during the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century. However, while 
male unemployment doubled during the 1990s, from 4 per cent in 1990 to almost 8 per cent in 
1999 (only to drop to 7 per cent in 2001), this amounted to less than half  the increase in 
female unemployment. The latter rose much faster, from about 11 per cent in 1990 to an all-
time high of 18 per cent in 1999, an increase of almost 8 percentage points. Although this 
figure had dropped to 15.5 per cent by 2001 (European Commission, 2002a, p.177) it 
remains, after Spain, the second highest figure in the EU.  
 
Education appears to have very little effect in changing this pattern of gender differentiation 
in the experience of unemployment. As can be observed in Table 10.1 it is only at the very 
ends of the educational spectrum - the very highly educated and the very low educated - that 
unemployment rates for men and women are similar. At all other levels, female 
unemployment is consistently higher, and in most cases double, that of men.  
 
[Table 10.1 about here] 
 
In addition, better education does not appear to improve one’s chances in the Greek labour 
market. Indeed, no clear pattern is identifiable. The overall unemployment levels for the very 
highly educated and the non-educated are almost identical. The level of unemployment for 
men with only a few years of primary school education is almost half of those with doctorates 
and postgraduate degrees and almost the same as those with a university degree, a clear 
indication of the Greek labour market’s buoyant demand for low skilled jobs, especially for 
men. Thus, lack of education appears to be a factor contributing to a high risk of 
unemployment only for women in Greece.  
 
The accelerated rise in long-term unemployment was another important feature of the increase 
in unemployment in Greece. By the year 2000, 57 per cent of the unemployed in Greece had 
been without work for at least one year - the second highest rate in the EU (Eurostat, 2001). 
However, long-term unemployment was not experienced equally among men and women. 
Indeed, Greece recorded the highest levels of long-term unemployment for women in Europe, 
almost three times that recorded for Greek men (European Commission, 2002a, Table 13). 
 
The increase in youth unemployment was another distinct feature. Similar to other southern 
EU countries, young people comprise a large proportion of the unemployed in Greece. A 
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report by the Greek National Labour Institute estimated that by the year 2000 almost 60 per 
cent of all the unemployed would be between the ages of 15-29.6 By 1999, almost one in three 
young people aged between 15-24 (30 per cent) were officially recorded as unemployed, a 
rise of almost 8 percentage points since 1990. This was the third highest rate in the EU after 
Spain and Italy and well above the EU average of 19.6 per cent (European Commission, 
2001; Eurostat, 2000a, p.13).  
 
Furthermore, the impact from the rise in unemployment was not shared equally across the 
Greek regions. In 1999, 42.6 per cent of young people aged 15-24 in the region of Epirus 
were unemployed, compared to 15.7 per cent in the islands of the southern Aegean (Eurostat, 
2000c). In terms of overall unemployment, the end of the 1990s found the regions of Epirus 
and western Macedonia with the highest unemployment rates in the country - 14.2 and 13.7 
per cent respectively. These were almost double the rates of the regions of Peloponnese and 
the Ionian Islands, which recorded the lowest incidence of unemployment (Ministry of Labour 
and Security, 2000). 
 
Finally, the risk of unemployment has increased dramatically in recent years. In a study of 
social precariousness that covered the period 1996-2001 (European Commission, 2002b, 
p.111), Greece was reported as the only country in Europe where the risk of unemployment 
had risen significantly. Indeed, the proportion of employees who had recently experienced 
unemployment rose substantially from 14.9 per cent in 1996 to 31.8 per cent in 2001; the 
highest increase among all EU countries.  
 
Overall, unemployment in Greece increased dramatically during the 1990s and continues at 
very high levels. This is mainly the result of the intensification of economic restructuring, the 
economic austerity measures that accompanied Greece’s effort to join the EMU and the 
changes in the structure of the Greek labour force. In addition, the two traditional Greek 
‘solutions’ to unemployment are now seriously curtailed. Migration of low skilled workers 
has diminished while the expansion of public sector employment is severely restricted due to 
budgetary constraints. The economic growth that characterized the late 1990s was a jobless 
growth (OECD, 2002, p.102; see also Table 10.2) while the recently observed reduction of 
unemployment rates was closely associated with increases in inactivity. The social groups 
who were - and are still - hit particularly hard were: the long-term unemployed, currently 
comprising almost half of total unemployment; women, whose unemployment rate is 
currently more than twice that of men, especially those with lower education and who lack 
skills; young people aged between 15-29, currently comprising more than half of the 
unemployed, and people of working age in specific regions, especially in the areas of 
northern-western and central Greece. 
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Response to the rise of unemployment 
 
Throughout the 1990s, the policy discourse regarding the state’s strategy to unemployment in 
Greece was closely associated with the European Employment Strategy (EES). Accordingly, 
there was a strong rhetorical emphasis upon at least three ‘needs’ (Ministry of Labour and 
Security, 2000, 2001a, 2002). First, the need to increase labour market ‘flexibility’. Second, 
the need for a shift from so-called ‘passive’ to the so-called ‘active’ labour market policies 
and, third, the need to develop new institutional infrastructures to facilitate the achievement of 
this objective.  
 
Indeed, a series of labour market reforms in 1998 and in late 2000 constituted the state’s 
response to the perceived need for increased labour market ‘flexibility’. The 1998 reforms 
introduced the Territorial Employment Pacts (TEPs) which allowed for wage flexibility by 
providing opportunities for ‘opting out‘ from national sectoral wage agreements. The 
provisions of the 2000 labour market reforms (Law 2874/2000) included a variety of 
measures: promotion of part-time work, reduction of weekly overtime and increases in 
overtime rates to encourage new recruitment, reduction of the working week from 40 to 38 
hours with the simultaneous introduction of working time annualization, increases in the 
thresholds of collective redundancies and a reduction in employers’ social security 
contributions for low wage employees.  It is beyond the scope of this chapter to evaluate these 
measures. Suffice to say, however, that the TEPs’ wage flexibility clauses proved to be very 
difficult to implement (OECD, 2002, p.105) while the 2000 reforms appear to have had only 
marginal effects in increasing employment. As can be seen in Table 10.2, which compares 
Greece’s performance towards achieving the Lisbon targets with EU averages, the increase in 
the total employment rate between 1995-2001 was less than 1 per cent. In the case of older 
workers, the employment rate has actually decreased by 3 per cent.  
 
[Table 10.2 about here] 
 
During the 1990s, and under conditions of increasing unemployment, the institutional 
capacity of the Greek Organization for Labour Force Employment (OAED)7 to effectively 
implement labour market policies was seriously questioned. In legislative terms, the emphasis 
on activation and the need for new administrative structures was highlighted in  Law 2434/96, 
which provided a new strategic framework for the administrative restructuring of OAED. 
According to the Greek National Action Plan for Employment, 2000, the ‘beacon’ of this 
strategy is the creation of a network of Employment Promotion Centres (KPAs), whose basic 
aims include: ‘a more effective link between supply and demand in the labour market; more 
efficient services for the unemployed, the working population, special social groups, and 
employers and businesses; a more effective link between training, education and employment; 
and the conversion of OAED’s employment policies from passive to active ones’ (Ministry of 
Labour and Security, 2000).   
 
The establishment of KPAs across the country has been promoted as a serious attempt to 
coordinate action at the local level and facilitate the development of pathways out of 
unemployment based on the individual characteristics of the unemployed. In particular, within 
the KPAs, special advisors are supposed to provide individually tailored support by creating 
Individual Action Plans and giving guidance to the unemployed so that they can choose 
among various trajectories, such as vocational training, subsidized employment or support 
with setting up their own business. It is worth noting here that this personalized service is in 
principle available only to those unemployed person ‘who express the desire to receive the 
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support of the Public Employment Services’ (Ministry of Labour and Security, 2001b, p.43). 
In other words, it is neither an obligation nor a precondition for the receipt of benefits. Up to 
2002, this personalized approach has not been implemented and in the 2001 Joint 
Employment Report, the European Commission urged Greece to intensify its efforts to deliver 
it.   
 
The need to create institutional structures to support and coordinate the formulation and 
implementation of employment and vocational training programmes has to be seen in the light 
of the objective to successfully utilize funding from the Second and Third Community 
Support Frameworks, and especially resources from the European Social Fund (ESF). In 
particular, for the period 2000-2006, ESF financing towards the programme Employment and 
Vocational Training amounts to €1,410 million, more than one third of the total ESF share for 
Greece.8 In fact, the role of ESF is paramount in financing labour market policy interventions 
in Greece, as can be seen in the following quote from the Greek National Action Plan for 
Employment 2000: ‘[..] the ESF will be the chief financial tool to carrying out the annual 
National Action Plan for Employment in Greece for the duration of the new planning period 
2000-2006’ (Ministry of Labour and Security, 2000, p.9, emphasis added).  
 
Via its main funding source, the ESF, and the production of annual National Action Plans for 
Employment, contemporary Greek employment policy is inexorably linked to the priorities 
and ‘rationale’ of the European Employment Strategy (EES).  Indeed, the perception of the 
Greek Ministry of Labour and Social Security is that annual plans function as ‘fundamental 
orientation and coordination tool[s]’ (Ministry of Labour and Security, 2000), linking national 
priorities to European objectives and vice-versa.  
 
Putting aside the desirability and effectiveness of framing the Greek employment strategy in 
the terms that the EES dictates (see Chapter 9) it appears that the implementation of the EES 
in Greece - a process that involves the formulation, monitoring and evaluation of annual 
National Action Plans for Employment - has accelerated the administrative restructuring of 
Public Employment Services. As shown, these developments are inexorably linked to the 
need for institutional mechanisms to support the successful utilization of financial resources 
from the EU, especially those provided by the ESF. The issue of funding is crucial in 
understanding these developments. It is the opinion of the author that the emphasis on 
‘activation’ of labour market policies in Greece is primarily linked to the availability of 
support from the ESF for these measures and has little to do with concerns regarding the lack 
of activation on behalf of the unemployed, a strategy for their re-commodification, or the 
incentive structure of the unemployment compensation system. Empirical evidence to support 
this opinion is examined below.      
 
Public Expenditure on labour market policies in Greece 
 
In most welfare states the size of social expenditure towards the unemployed is a function of 
the number of the unemployed. It usually increases when unemployment increases so that a 
country with comparatively low levels of unemployment usually records (comparatively) low 
levels of expenditure. Declining or consistently low levels of expenditure that remain 
relatively unchanged despite increasing unemployment are indicative of systems offering 
inadequate welfare state support towards the unemployed. This is, to a very large extent, the 
case in Greece. In particular, total social expenditure towards unemployment in Greece has 
been traditionally very low in comparison to international standards.  Figure 10.1 compares 
the latest available data (Funck and Pizzati, 2002) on public spending on unemployment 
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compensation as a percentage of GDP adjusted for levels of unemployment across the EU. In 
1999, and as a percentage of its GDP,9 Greece had the lowest level of expenditure among EU 
member states. It was almost one fifth of the OECD and EU averages and only a tiny fraction 
of the respective spending in the Netherlands, the highest spender on (adjusted) 
unemployment compensation in the EU. Combined together, expenditure on ‘active’ labour 
market policies and expenditure on unemployment benefits comprised 0.84 per cent of Greek 
GDP in 1998 (OECD, 2001a, p.24). This was almost a sixth that of Denmark (5.03 per cent), 
the highest spender in the EU, and well below the EU average.   
 
[Figure 10.1 about here] 
 
When the trend of social expenditure on unemployment compensation at 1995 contatnt prices 
is placed against the backdrop of (rising) unemployment during the 1990s, a peculiar picture 
emerges (Figure 10.2). Namely, that while unemployment was increasing, the level of annual 
unemployment compensation expenditure in Greece decreased at the beginning of the 1990s, 
remained  almost static -at very low levels- during the mid 1990s   and only started rising 
significantly from 1999 onwards.  
 
These empirical observations clearly demonstrate that , t the system of social protection for 
the unemployed in Greece was totally ill-prepared to meet the dramatic rise in unemployment 
during the 1990s. Its levels of support were inadequate by any standards, while its limited 
extent of coverage resulted in large numbers of the unemployed being excluded from access 
to any benefits.  These systemic inadequacies can be explained   by taking  into account three 
structural factors. First, the strict conditions regarding entitlement to benefits and especially 
the short, fixed time-period for which entitlement is granted. Second, the very low monetary 
value of the benefit package for the unemployed and, third, the lack of a guaranteed minimum 
income scheme or ‘safety net’ for the long-term unemployed. These are explored further in 
the next section 
 
[Figure 10.2 about here] 
 
The adequacy of unemployment compensation in Greece 
 
One of the key characteristics of the rules regulating unemployment benefits in Greece10 is 
that entitlement to such benefits is strictly conditional upon social insurance contributions. As 
a result, entitlement to unemployment benefits is granted mainly to individuals with long or 
uninterrupted employment records. Unemployed persons with short or interrupted 
contribution records, i.e. persons like unemployed women or young unemployed people, or 
first-time job seekers who have no contributions record, are entitled to unemployment 
benefits for very short periods after which no entitlement to benefits is granted. In the case of 
first-time job-seekers, entitlement is granted after a very long waiting period (12 months) 
during which no benefit is paid. After this long waiting period, a very low benefit is paid for a 
maximum of 5 months. 
 
Second, various studies comparing the adequacy of unemployment benefits have confirmed 
that the benefit income package for the unemployed in Greece (i.e. the combination of 
unemployment benefits and family and other benefits) is among the lowest in the EU 
(Papadopoulos, 2003, 1997; OECD, 1999; European Commission, 1995). A sample of the 
latest available OECD data is presented in Table 10.3, where benefit packages to which 
different unemployed households are entitled in Greece are compared with those of other EU 
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member states. These figures represent the percentage of previous income that the 
unemployment benefit income packages could potentially replace. The assumption behind the 
calculations is that there is only one income earner in each type of household, who is 40 years 
of age, with a full employment record, who was earning a salary equal to that of an average 
production worker (APW) before the termination of employment. In other words, these cases 
represent the ‘best case scenario’ where the beneficiary is entitled to the maximum level of 
benefits. It should be noted that these are net replacement rates, meaning that they are 
calculated after tax, social security contributions, unemployment benefits, family and housing 
benefits are taken into account in all the household types.  
 
[Table 10.3 about here] 
 
The comparison reveals that the Greek benefit income package is among the least generous in 
the EU in two out of four household types, single unemployed and married couple. For a 
couple with two children and a lone parent with two children, the Greek benefit package is the 
least generous in the EU, a fact that also highlights the lack of any redistribution of resources 
towards families with children in Greece. The benefit package for a couple with two children 
replaces only 44 per cent of previous earnings in Greece, 26 percentage points lower than the 
EU average and 3 percentage points less than the package for a single unemployed. For an 
unemployed lone parent with two children the benefit package replaces only 47 per cent of 
previous earnings, 23 percentage points lower than the EU average.  
 
Indeed, adequacy of support for the unemployed in Greece compares even more poorly with 
other EU countries when one takes into account three additional factors, namely that: 
 
• average wages in Greece are among the lowest in Europe (INE, 2002, 2001), i.e. a 
small replacement rate in Table 10.3 represents a small replacement of an already low wage; 
• there is no safety net for the unemployed after entitlement to insurance benefit has 
expired (this is discussed further below); and  
• the monetary value of the benefit package for the unemployed has been, and continues 
to be, eroded.  
 
By the end of 2001 the unemployment benefit’s minimum, basic amount comprised less than 
50 per cent of the minimum daily wage of an unskilled worker, far lower than the minimum 
level of 66.6 per cent set as a standard by the relevant legislation (Law 2224/94). Thus, the 
erosion of the value of unemployment benefits in Greece continues, as can be seen in Figure 
10.3 where the trajectory of unemployment benefit as a percentage of the minimum wage is 
presented. The high inflation of the early 1990s had a powerful negative effect upon the 
relative value of unemployment benefit. Even after some slight improvement in the late 
1990s, the relative value of the benefit is still way below the minimum level of 66.6 per cent. 
The last time the benefit equalled this minimum level was in 1982. 
 
Since November 2001, various minor increases in the amount of unemployment benefit were 
announced by the Greek government.11 These are still not enough to compensate for the 
serious reduction in the monetary value of the benefit package that took place during the 
1990s. A substantial increase in  unemployment compensation expenditure is necessary if the 
value of the benefit is to be restored to the level set as a standard by the current legislation.  
Currently, the level of unemployment compensation is totally inadequate to sustain a decent 
standard of living and one can safely argue that there are absolutely no ‘incentives’ to stay on 
unemployment benefits in Greece. Against this background, the rhetoric that emphasizes the 
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‘need’ to move from ‘passive’ to ‘active’ policies in Greece, as set out in the EES and clearly 
identifiable in consecutive Greek National Action Plans for Employment (Ministry of Labour 
and Security, 2000, 2001a, 2002), simply does not make sense.  
 
Finally, entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits is available for a maximum of up to 
12 months for those with a full employment record. Given that in Greece there is no 
institutionalized form of social assistance for the long-term unemployed, apart from a means 
tested scheme for those older than 45 years of age,12 welfare support terminates with the end 
of entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits. As a result, only a small proportion of the 
unemployed in Greece claim benefits at any point in time. In fact, consistently during the 
1990s, less than 10 per cent of the unemployed per year were receiving unemployment 
benefits (Standing, 2000).  
 
The obvious question that arises here is how do the long-term unemployed in Greece cope 
with the lack of welfare support? As shown above, this group constitutes more than half of all 
unemployed persons and although access to some form of income support might be available 
through participation in a vocational training programme, this participation is neither 
obligatory nor guaranteed for all. The results of a comparative study of poverty, 
unemployment and social ties in EU member states are indicative here. The study found that 
in Greece more than 50 per cent of unemployed people who were living alone were receiving 
support from family and friends; the highest percentage in the EU  (Paugam, 1999).   
 
What emerges here is the ‘familistic’ character of welfare support that vast numbers of the 
unemployed receive in Greece. This is clearly highlighted when the household composition of 
the unemployed in Greece is examined. During the second half of the 1990s the vast majority 
of the unemployed, 54 per cent, were children of the head ofhousehold, while the second 
largest group, 24 per cent, were spouses of the head of household (Eurostat, 1998, Table 121). 
These two groups, young people and spouses (the vast majority of which are women) are 
precisely those groups that not only tend to be excluded from unemployment compensation 
benefits but also constitute large proportions of the long-term unemployed. Unless they 
participate in a job subsidization scheme or a subsidized vocational training scheme, they most 
probably will receive support from within the family.   
 
Last but by no means least, it must be noted that contrary to other EU countries, public 
employment services in Greece played, at least until recently, only a marginal role in the 
labour search activity of the unemployed. For example, according to 1996 EU Labour Force 
Survey results, only 6 per cent of the unemployed in Greece contacted the public employment 
office as a method of searching for employment compared to an EU average of approximately 
70 per cent (Eurostat, 1998, Table 109). The majority of Greek job-seekers either applied to 
employers directly (40 per cent compared to an EU average of 9 per cent) or asked friends and 
relatives (32 per cent compared to an EU average of 7 per cent).   
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Concluding remarks: welfare support for the unemployed and the Greek welfare regime  
 
In Greece, there are no ‘incentives’ to stay on unemployment compensation benefits given 
their levels and limited duration. Thus, it is reasonable to expect that the unemployed who 
have no other means of support, or are heads of households with family commitments, will 
actively seek work during their spell of unemployment. It is in this context that Petraki-Kottis 
argued that the Greek unemployment insurance system functions as ‘if it was part of an 
activation strategy’ (Petraki-Kottis, 1997, p.26). Furthermore, the lack of a safety net for the 
vast majority of long-term unemployed, as well as for those who do not qualify for 
unemployment insurance, and the fact that participation in active labour market programmes 
is voluntary, often turns participation in these programmes into a means of accessing 
(temporarily) some form of unemployment compensation. The result is a paradoxical picture 
that renders any differentiation between ‘passive’ or ‘active’ policies almost meaningless in 
the case of Greece.  
 
In the light of the empirical findings presented in this chapter, it can be safely argued that the 
Greek system of unemployment compensation is both institutionally and financially incapable 
of providing adequate welfare support to the majority of the unemployed. Institutionally 
because, given the predominance of the unemployment insurance principle, the largest groups 
of the unemployed  - young people and women - are effectively excluded from any serious 
unemployment compensation. And, financially because the levels of unemployment 
compensation for those who can establish entitlement are remarkably low and last for a 
maximum of 12 months. The recent, modest increases in unemployment benefit levels are not 
enough to guarantee a socially acceptable standard of living for the unemployed. Furthermore, 
the lack of a safety net for the long-term unemployed who are under 45 years of age 
completes the negative picture. The international comparisons presented earlier confirmed, 
albeit in dramatic colours, the low levels of support for the unemployed, placing Greece 
firmly in the group of welfare ‘laggards‘ in the EU. Indeed, Greece exemplifies all the 
characteristics of the sub-protective type of unemployment welfare systems put forward by 
Gallie and Paugan (2000, p.5); namely, very incomplete coverage, very weak level and 
duration of cover and limited active employment policy.  
 
The continuing inadequacy of unemployment compensation in Greece proves that societal 
control via the welfare state over the functioning of the (labour) market is very weak. The 
right to de-commodification as a means of adequate compensation for loss (or lack) of 
employment is clearly not part of state-provided welfare support. In this context, it is the 
reliance on family and informal networks that establishes a mode of de-commodification 
based on non-institutionalized arrangements for the unemployed who do not have access to 
benefits (Gonzalez, 2002, p. 157). Moreover, the fact that very few of the unemployed use the 
public employment office as a means of searching for employment, indicates that decisions 
about the labour market behaviour of individuals clearly form part of households’ strategies 
and have little to do with state support or intervention.  
 
All these are not only consistent with labour market behaviours embedded in a ‘familistic’ 
welfare regime but are key elements in its reproduction (Gonzalez, 2002; Flaquer, 2001). In 
Greece, as well as in other southern European states, the minimalism of state involvement in 
welfare provision rests upon the maximalism of familism. This model of societal reproduction 
relies heavily on the domestication of women - the ‘compulsory altruists’ according to 
Symeonidou (1996) - and their unpaid care work, even when they do participate in the official 
and unofficial labour markets. Further, it assumes the uninterrupted commodification of the 
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main earner of the household who, in the vast majority of cases, is the father. Thus, in Greece, 
as in other southern European countries, the male breadwinner model is still being reproduced 
by the welfare system.  
 
The inadequacies of the Greek unemployment compensation system enhance and reproduce 
the familistic character of the welfare regime. As González argues: 
 
Now with a more flexible labour market in which the number of non-stable jobs is increasing 
and non-qualified workers occupy the lowest levels in private companies, the family 
strengthens its inclusive role. Labour is becoming increasingly precarious and the concept of 
lifelong employment is disappearing in favour of temporary contracts in a flexible market. In 
this context, the family and other social networks become increasingly [more] important as 
inclusive factors  
(González, 2002, p.173)  
 
The vitality of the familistic welfare regime in Greece lies precisely in the ‘enclosure‘ of the 
discussion of issues of welfare provision within the family. As long as questions and answers 
about care, welfare support, or labour market choices remain mostly  ‘private’, i.e. within 
households, and as long as the privileges of various powerful, socio-professional groups are 
maintained by the subordination of social policy to their ‘social politics’ (Venieris, 1996 
p.268) the family will continue to play its role as the key provider of welfare support to its 
members. In the ‘brave new world’ of labour market flexibilization, where recommodification 
strategies are aggressively pursued by ‘active welfare states’ across Europe, the welfare 
regime in Greece appears to function comfortably with its familistic model of societal 
reproduction. This is because it allows the Greek political economy to function with only a 
minimum of ‘internalization’ - either in political or market terms - of the social and economic 
costs associated with market-driven economic restructuring. In this context, the room, scope 
and willingness for significant policy change are very limited. Indeed, policy proposals that 
fail to see this dimension of the political economy in Greece run the risk of being nothing 
more than a series of wish lists: demands for welfare-state institutions to act as positive 
welfare agents when their effective role has more to do with managing the absence of the 
welfare state in Greece rather than bringing about costly changes. 
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Figure 10.1 Spending on unemployment compensation, adjusted for unemployment 
levels,* in EU member states, 1999 
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Note: * Ratio of public spending on unemployment compensation as % of GDP to 
unemployment rate.  
Source: Funck and Pizzati, 2002 
 13
  
Figure 10.2  Unemployment rates and annual expenditure on unemployment benefits at 
1995 constant prices in Greece, 1991-2001 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: *Expenditure on unemployment benefits (left axis) is measured in thousands of  Euros. 
Unemployment rate (right axis) is measured as a % of the labour force.   
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Figure 10. 3  Unemployment benefit for a single person - previously on average male 
earnings - as a % of the minimum wage in Greece, 1982-1999 
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Source: Author’s calculations based on data provided by OAED  
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Table 10. 1  Unemployment rate by gender and educational level, 2001 (ages 25-64) 
 
    Men  Women  Total 
Doctorate or post-graduate degree 8.8 8.3  8.6 
University degree 4.1 8.9  6.3 
Further education degree (technical direction) 5.9 13.8 9.5 
Upper-secondary school certificate 6.3 14.8 9.6 
Lower-secondary school certificate 6.5 19.9 10.5 
Primary school education 4.3 10.6 6.7 
A few years of primary school 3.1 5.1 4.0 
No schooling 7.3  8.7  8.0 
 
Source: Ministry of Labour and Security, 2002, p. 90. 
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Table 10. 2  Progress towards achieving the Lisbon targets 
 
Greece EU 2010 target
Total employment rate (2001) 55.4 63.9 70
Change 1995-01 0.8 4
Female employment rate (2001) 40.9 54.9 more than 60
Change 1995-01 2.8 5.3
Older workers’ employment rate (2001) 38 38.5 50
Change 1995-01 -3 2.6
 
Source: European Commission, 2002a 
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Table 10.3  Net replacement rates for four family types at average earnings levels in EU 
member states 
 
 
Single 
 
Married  
Couple 
Couple- 
2 children 
Lone parent 
- 2 children 
Austria 60 62 76 73 
Belgium 64 61 64 65 
Denmark 63 63 73 78 
Finland 65 71 83 87 
France 71 68 72 72 
Germany 60 56 70 71 
Greece 47 47 44 47 
Ireland 31 44 57 52 
Italy 42 44 53 50 
Luxembourg 82 82 87 87 
Netherlands 82 89 89 81 
Portugal 79 78 79 80 
Spain 74 74 73 76 
Sweden 71 71 78 85 
United Kingdom 46 46 49 49 
     
EU15 average 63 64 70 70 
 
Note: Replacement rates are calculated after tax and including unemployment benefits, family 
and housing benefits in the first month of benefit receipt. Data for 1999. 
Source: OECD, 2002; Benefits and Wages, OECD Indicators 
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Notes 
 
                                                 
1 As Andersen,  et al (2002, p.7) pointed out, this was achieved through publications such as the OECD’s  Jobs 
Study, the proposals of the OECD Jobs Strategy and the specific country recommendations that accompanied them. 
2 Putting aside for a moment the moral undertones regarding the behaviour of the unemployed that are implicit in 
the use of the words ‘passive’ and ‘active’ it was never clarified adequately in the conventional literature why an 
adequate level of ‘passive’ unemployment compensation providing effective help during the period of job 
searching is contributing less to the activation of the unemployed than an ‘active’ seminar of vocational training. 
3 It should be mentioned, however, that during the 1990s the size of the labour force increased in Greece, at least 
partly as a result of the increase in the number of women looking for employment and the official registration of 
economic migrants which begun in 1998.    
4 Although the problem of the official measurement of unemployment in Greece is beyond the scope of this 
article, it is worth noting that substantial divergence between the unemployment rates calculated using different 
official methods has been identified by Greek researchers (Petraki-Kottis, 1997). In addition, reports in the 
Greek media indicate less than perfect procedures with regard to the collection of the usually more reliable 
Labour Force Survey data (see article in the newspaper, Eleftherotypia, ‘Alchemy with the fall in 
unemployment?’, 8 August 2001).  
5 Eleytherotypia, 20 July 2003. 
6 Eleftherotypia, 23 January 2001  
7  OAED is the institution mainly responsible for implementing labour market policies in Greece. OAED is a 
self-administering legal entity under public law and, in principle, is financed solely by contributions from 
employees and employers. However, ad hoc financial support from the state plays a dominant role in its 
financing. OAED’s administrative council resembles a corporatist structure consisting of representatives of 
employees, employers, the OAED itself and experts. The chair is held by the director of OAED, a political 
appointee, while the organization itself is subject to the supervision of the Ministry of Labour and Social 
Security.  
8 See the European Commission’s Press Release ‘Structural Funds: Commission agrees 1,420 million 
employment and training programme for Greece’, Press Release, P/01/372 , Brussels, 15th March 2001.  
9  A methodological point of caution should be raised here. When comparing the measurement of social 
expenditure as a percentage of GDP across time, the fluctuations in the size of GDP might affect measurements. 
If expenditure remains the same and GDP increases then the same amount of expenditure will represent a smaller 
percentage of the (increased) GDP. In other words, when compared across time the same amount of expenditure 
will be recorded as a ‘decrease’, if the GDP increases. This is the case in Greece where public expenditure 
towards unemployment compensation and labour market programmes, as a percentage of GDP, appears to 
‘decrease’ in various years during in the 1990s.     
10  A detailed description of the system of unemployment compensation in Greece is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. Interested readers can contact the author for copies of a short guide to unemployment compensation in 
Greece.     
11 Reported in the newspaper ΤΑ ΝΕΑ, 19 November 2001, p.44. 
12 A means-tested unemployment assistance benefit of approximately  €142 per month has become available 
since 1 January 2002, for 35,000 long-term unemployed aged 45-65. Still, no assistance is available to the long-
term unemployed who are under 45 years of age. 
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